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Introduction
In this paper I examine whether there exists a diversification discount or a premium in Germany, discuss several reasons for the results and investigate the relationship between the diversification discount and corporate governance behavior. This empirical work covers all publicly traded German companies that are available in the Worldscope database between 1991 and 2003. I also investigate the largest German companies in detail.
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the diversification discount in Germany and relates this topic to corporate governance behavior. The main contribution of this work can be summarized by the following three points:
First, I document that the existing papers and the underlying procedures for the valuation of diversified firms are biased due to measurement errors and provide too high excess values. Therefore, the applied method uses another measure to get unbiased valuation results.
Second, I consider two sets of peer groups, one with pure German firms and one with German and European firms for the valuation process, to avoid a general overor undervaluation of German firms. In this context I also give a detailed description how diversification affects the value of the 30 largest firms in Germany. Finally, I discuss how valuation uncertainty and diversification trends affect the conglomerate discount over time.
Third, I document how a potential conglomerate discount is related to corporate governance developments. The idea is that a positive corporate governance behavior overcomes several causes that lead to a conglomerate discount. To do so, I perform a regression analysis with a corporate governance rating for all DAX 30 companies and the conglomerate discount values from the previous analysis.
The results of this paper indicate that firms in Germany will be traded at a valuation discount of about 3% to 10% on average if one uses the standard methods provided by Berger and Ofek (1995) as well as subsequent authors and at an average valuation discount of 21% to 23% if one uses comparable companies from a combined German and European sample. These are significant differences that are only caused by methodical discrepancies but not by fundamental changes. The valuation results of the largest 30 firms in Germany (selected from the DAX 30 index) show that diversification discounts or premiums can be associated with industry membership.
For instance, most firms in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry trade at a valuation discount, while firms in the technology and telecommunication industry trade at a valuation premium. These results are robust over time. I also provide evidence that higher uncertainties in valuation -measured as within peer group variation -are associated with lower valuation accuracy, and also that an increasing diversification over time leads to higher discounts on average.
I also test whether there exists a relationship between the conglomerate discount and corporate governance behavior and show that a positive corporate governance behavior of a company reduces the diversification discount or turns the discount into a premium. Possible arguments for these findings are that a decline of agency costs is associated with conglomerate firm structures. Some determinants to explain the conglomerate discount are agency costs arising from ineffective internal capital markets, suboptimal incentive compensation for managers, information asymmetries between segment managers and increased incentive for rent seeking by managers. A well-established corporate governance is a possible way to reduce these deficits and also the discount of the company.
The idea that companies with several business segments trade at a discount compared to their single-segment counterparts remains a well established result in financial research. For instance, Lang and Stulz (1994) as well as Berger and Ofek (1995) show that the discount for U.S. companies ranges between 13% and 54% depending on the valuation method. Recent papers by Campa and Kedia (2002) as well as Graham et al. (2002) show that there exists a strong selection bias which causes a large fraction of the discount. Schoar (2002) and Villalonga (2004a) use establishmentlevel data to value diversified companies. They present evidence that the discount can be reduced or turns into a premium if more detailed company data are used.
There exists only few research that documents a discount for other countries than the United States. Lins and Servaes (1999) find a discount for Japan and the United Kingdom of about 10% and 15%, respectively, while they are not able to determine a discount for German firms. Schwetzler and Reimund (2003) present an average discount of about 6% for Germany. Altogether, most researchers see negative impacts of diversification on market value but the results cover a wide range and seem to be quite ambiguous.
There is widespread research about corporate governance and the effects of corporate governance behavior on company values. Papers from Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2003) , Bauer, Gunster and Otten (2004) or Black (2001) document that corporate governance is of relevance for the firm value. On the other hand there is no paper that documents a significant relationship between corporate governance and the conglomerate discount. This paper has the following structure: in section 2 the related literature of the conglomerate discount and diversification will be discussed. Section 3 presents the dataset. Section 4 documents the diversification discount for all available German firms from 1991 to 2003, and for the 30 largest firms in detail. Section 5 presents reasons for the conglomerate discount and shows the relationship between excess value and several explanatory variables. Section 6 relates the diversification discount to corporate governance behavior. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
There exists a comprehensive literature about the diversification discount. The idea that diversified firms have a lower value than the sum of their segments dates back to the empirical observations of Lang and Stulz (1994) as well as Berger and Ofek (1995) .
They provide evidence that the discount of U.S. firms compared to their singlesegment counterparts in the same industry ranges between 13% and 54% depending on the valuation multiple and the year considered. Typical multiples in this context are firm value to sales, firm value to assets, firm value to EBIT and Tobin's q. Servaes (1996) supports the findings of the previous literature. He covers an earlier period from 1961 to 1976 and calculates significant conglomerate discounts especially in the 1970s. His results are robust to differences in industry-adjustments and additional control variables like size as well as variables that measure financial constraints. Schoar (2002) and Villalonga (2004a) use the common valuation methodology but other than the standard data sources provided by Compustat. Villalonga compares BITS (Business Information Tracking Series) and Compustat data for firms in the United States and shows that the first data source provides a conglomerate premium while the latter a valuation discount. The premium is robust both over time and with respect to different control variables.
Summarized, I find that all investigations use similar valuation approaches, datasets and multiples. The typical multiples are based on sales, assets, EBIT or Tobin's q, the averaging method uses mean or median and typical excess values are calculated by using the natural logarithm of the ratio between the observed market value and the imputed value.
There are only few papers that consider other countries than the U.S. to document the conglomerate discount. Lins and Servaes (1999) investigate firms in Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany. They find a discount of 10% for Japanese and of 15% for British firms, while there is no discount for German firms. Due to deficits of their database they only use sales multiples. They explain the non-existence of a discount in Germany with the concentrated ownership structure of insiders that leads to higher firm values. Another paper from Lins and Servaes (2002) investigates seven emerging market countries. They find that the diversification discount is about 7% on average.
They explain the discount with a lower profitability of diversified firms, a membership of industrial groups and a management ownership concentration between 10% and 30%. Fauver, Houston and Naranjo (2002) cover 8,000 companies from 35 countries and find that the conglomerate discount is negatively related to the level of capital market integration and development. They also provide evidence that a country's legal system and the ownership structure of the firm affect the value of diversified firms. Schwetzler and Reimund (2003) show that cash holdings of diversified firms lead to biased results. After deducting cash from the firm value the average discount is about 6%. Overall, the discount for countries outside the United States ranges 5 between 5% and 15%.
Data Selection
This study uses market and accounting data from the Thomson Financial Worldscope database. For the investigations I require three datasets. The first contains all German multi-segment firms, the second contains all German single-segment firms and the third contains all German and European single-segment firms. Here, European firms are drawn from Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain (Euro countries). The sample datasets cover data from all years between 1991 and 2003. I do not exclude financial firms because a significant fraction of German firms operates in the financial industry or contains segments in this industry. I also provide summarized results for datasets without financial companies to show that financial companies do not produce deviating figures. All three datasets have the following restrictions: market price, number of shares, net sales, total debt and total assets have to be available for each firm and each year. Information about net sales, assets and industry membership based on SIC-codes for at least one industry segment have to be available. The sum of segment sales has to be within 1% of net sales of the whole firm. 5.6% of the observations in 2002 show deviations of more than 1% which is a secondary problem. For assets the quantity of observations that exceeds 1% is 58.4%. Together with the fact that I have less segment information for assets than for sales I would lose too many observations to produce reliable results. Therefore, I scale the current asset value A of segment i to the new assets value for one specific firm f in the following way:
where total assets f SEG f j=1
is the scaling factor, and SEG f is the number of segments for firm f. The ratio of total assets and the sum of segment assets for one firm will be multiplied with each segment. Finally, the sum of the scaled segment assets is equal to total assets. This procedure results in a dataset of 3,228 firm-years for German multi-segment firms, 3,080 firm-years for German single-segment firms and 27,492 firm-years for European single-segment firms. I will not only document the conglomerate discount for all German firms on average but also for the largest 30 firms in Germany in detail. Table 2 
The Conglomerate Discount for German Firms
In this section I investigate whether there exists a conglomerate discount or a con- 
Valuation Methodology
To investigate value differences between single-and multi-segment firms, I apply the valuation methodology of Berger and Ofek (1995) but apply some modifications.
Excess value is calculated by using the natural logarithm of the ratio of the observed enterprise value to the imputed enterprise value. Market value will be calculated by multiplying market value per share with the number of shares. Enterprise value is the sum of market value of equity and book value of total debt. The imputed value of the whole firm is the sum of the imputed values of all available segments based on 2-digit SIC-codes.
A segment's imputed value can be calculated by using the sales or assets value of the segment multiplied with either the arithmetic mean or median ratio of the firm value to the accounting item of an industry peer group or the geometric mean of that ratio. While the mean and the median ratios have been used by several authors, the geometric mean is a new measure. For instance, Lang and Stulz (1994) , Servaes (1996) and Villalonga (2004a) use the arithmetic mean to average ratios from comparable companies. Berger and Ofek (1995) , Servaes (1999), Campa and Kedia (2002) , Mansi and Reeb (2002) as well as Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) operate with the median of these ratios. Villalonga (2004b) uses median averaging for sales and assets multiples, while she applies arithmetic mean to Tobin's q. She shows that excess values 4 based on Tobin's q are notably lower than on assets 5 , which is a remarkable result, because assets multipliers and Tobin's q follow a similar data definition. I discuss the averaging method for the peer group's sales or assets ratio that leads to the valuation multiple in detail, because Dittmann and Maug (2005) show that arithmetic mean averaging produces skewed results. This means in the case of the conglomerate discount that the calculated excess values based on arithmetic mean averaging is too high. They further provide evidence that a logarithmic transformation before averaging or the use of geometric mean averaging procedures result in unbiased excess values and produce smaller discount values. Therefore, this paper uses and displays excess values based on the median and geometric mean averaging procedure.
The selection of peer group firms is also of critical importance. Therefore, I
propose an algorithm used by Alford (1992) I use the methodology proposed by Berger and Ofek (1995) with some differences.
Empirical Results
The averaging method for the combination is of critical importance. Therefore, each segment of a firm will be valued separately by multiplying the sales (assets) value with the median ratio between enterprise value and sales (assets) of the peer group. This valuation procedure is coherent with several other studies. As mentioned previously, this leads to an unbiased result, if I use median as the averaging method.
Additionally, I perform the same procedure with geometric mean instead of median aggregation. The The automobile industry provides negative excess values for almost all methods. Only BMW has a premium based on assets multiples and German peer groups. One reason could be the high number of segments that each of the firms contain. The average number of different segments for the four firms in the automobile industry is 5, while for the previous industry the average number of segments is 3. In the European environment German firms in the automobile industry also have a discount. The two firms in the utility industry E.ON and RWE also trade at a discount in most cases independently of the underlying peer group and the valuation method. These results can be related to the high number of segments. Telecommunication and technology tend to have a high excess value. Second, for several industries like banking and financial service providers, automobile producers or utilities I find a discount for all member firms. One reason is the higher diversification of some industries another seems to be a general undervaluation. Third, the underlying peer groups have a significant influence on the valuation results.
Overall, I find that pure German and mixed German and European peer groups lead to different results. I also document that the discount for German firms is low on average but the fluctuation from one year to the next is high. I will now discuss some explanations for these findings.
Explaining the Conglomerate Discount
In this section I will provide several explanations for my previous results that there exists a conglomerate discount in Germany. The first analysis shows how uncertainties about valuation have developed over time and how this is related to the conglomerate discount. I measure the variation of multiples and assume that a higher variation 22 leads to higher valuation errors and higher excess values. In my second analysis I calculate different diversification measures and their change over time. I relate these results to the development of the conglomerate discount over time. My assumption is that a higher degree of diversification over all firms within one year leads to a higher discount, while a lower diversification leads to a lower discount. I support the analysis by running fixed-effects regressions.
Uncertainties about Valuation
In this section I want to find out whether there is a relation between uncertainties about valuation and the conglomerate discount. I expect to find that a significant fraction of the diversification discount is caused by valuation errors and variation of multiples and not by a general undervaluation of conglomerates. Due to the fact that the selection of peer groups is of critical importance for the valuation accuracy, one should see a better prediction of the real firm value, if the variance between the peer multiples is relatively low. On the other hand if the variance is high, one should see higher valuation errors that can deviate in both directions. Bhojraj and Lee (2003) show that a classification of firms that have more homogeneous financial ratios provide more accurate valuation predictions. Dittmann and Maug (2005) show that an increase in the standard deviation within industries by 1/3 leads to an increase in valuation errors of more than 100% for percentage errors.
I calculate the annual variation in multiples V, i.e. the overall average standard deviation of multiples within industries of segments, by
where std p∈C f,j enterprise value p total assetsp j is the standard deviation of the peer group multiples of segment j, sgn contains the number of different segments of firm f and F is the number of all firms in the sample. C f,j is the peer group for firm f's segment j.
The sample covers all multi-segment firms from the previous investigation (Table 1, Panel A). 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 standard deviation of multiples I would expect that a higher uncertainty of valuation, i.e. a higher coefficient of variation is related to a lower valuation reliability of the company. In the context of the conglomerate discount problem one might see a discount or a premium that is not caused by fundamental characteristics of conglomerate structures but by valuation accuracy; i.e. the possibility of an over-or underestimation of the conglomerate discount increases.
To present a more detailed investigation between excess value and valuation uncertainty I use a regression analysis between the excess value and the variation of multiples. I calculate uncertainty about valuation for each company according to equation 2. I use 2 different specifications for the regression. The first specification is defined by the equation
where (Variation of Multiples) is the average standard deviation of multiples over all segments of a firm and excess value is the natural logarithm of the ratio between observed firm value and imputed value. The imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of each segment. A segment's imputed value is the sales value of the segment multiplied with the geometric mean ratio of the firm value to sales of an industry peer group. With the first specification I want to test the effect of valuation accuracy on possible discounts. It is an obvious result that this is only an indication of the influence of valuation effects because these effects deviate in both directions. The second specification takes both directions of deviation into account and covers the possibility of an over-or-undervaluation. It is defined as
where I use the absolute excess value as the dependent variable. Table 5 presents the results of my analysis separately for each year from 1991 to 2003. Displayed are the number of observations, the coefficients for each specification and the significance levels. It is the natural logarithm of the ratio between the observed firm value and the imputed value. The imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of each segment. A segment's imputed value is the sales value of the segment multiplied with the geometric mean ratio of the firm value to sales of an industry peer group. The variation of multiples for one firm is the average variation of multiples over all segments. The variation for one segment is measured as the standard deviation of peer group multiples. Specification 1 shows the coefficients of the described regression, specification 2 defines excess value as an absolute value. The results indicate that there is a relationship between the variation of multiples and the conglomerate discount. The coefficients of the first regression show that there is a negative relation between the dependent and independent variable. This means that a high variation of multiples leads to a high diversification discount. Only in 1991 Only in , 1992 Only in , 1999 Only in and 2003 the coefficients are positive. Significance indicates that there is weak relationship between valuation uncertainty and excess value. In 5 years the regression is significant, while in the remaining 8 years I observe no significance.
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The coefficients of the second specification show the relationship between valuation uncertainty and excess value, independently, whether it is a discount or a premium.
Interestingly, all years except 2000 and 2002 show a significant relationship. I would assume this relationship, because a higher dispersion of multiples leads to lower valuation accuracy and this results in a higher deviation between the observed enterprise value and the estimated enterprise value. The result is a higher possibility of an overor undervaluation.
I conclude, based on the observation of the previous results, that the selection of peer groups and the definition and determination of industries is of critical importance to get reliable insights. A higher variation within industries can lead to an overor undervaluation, which means that the conglomerate discount or conglomerate premium might in some cases not only be caused by the conglomerate structure itself but also by the valuation procedure.
Conglomerate Discount and Diversification
In this section I test how diversification changes over time and how it is related to the conglomerate discount. One can assume that a low average diversification within one year is related to a moderate excess value. On the other hand if I find a high diversification, which is defined by a higher number of segments per firm and a higher dispersion of sales over segments, then I would expect a higher diversification discount. I use three measures of diversification. For each firm f I calculate the Herfindahl index H which is defined as
where sgn is the number of segments for firm f, sales j,f is net sales for the segment j of firm f and sales f are total sales for firm f. If H is equal to one then the underlying firm has only one segment. If H is close to zero, then the underlying firms has many segments and each segment has a similar distribution of sales values. The second and third measure of diversification are the concentration ratios C4 and C8 for firm f that are defined as 
where the C4 concentration ratio measures the share of the four largest segment sales and the C8 concentration measures the share of the 8 largest segment sales. I will now conduct a regression analysis between diversification and the conglomerate discount to get more detailed and reliable results between these two measures. The results show that all coefficients are positive and significant. The differences between OLS and fixed effect regression are low, but I see that OLS coefficients are always higher. The analysis provides evidence that a lower average degree of diversification is correlated with a lower conglomerate discount.
Diversification and Corporate Governance
In this section I relate the diversification discount to corporate governance behavior.
I use the DAX 30 firms for this analysis. I assume that a significant fraction of the value difference between conglomerates and single-segment firms is caused not only by higher agency costs due to structural determinants but by corporate governance and firm policy.
Classical arguments to explain the conglomerate discount are that additional agency costs arise from ineffective internal capital markets, suboptimal incentive compensation for managers, information asymmetries between segment managers as firm and to the MSCI EAFE index, which covers 1070 international firms. I call the first method "industry" and the second "international". Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics of the corporate governance value for a firm from the DAX 30 relative to a peer group of 1,070 international firms and relative to firms from the same industry based on the GICS classification system. A corporate governance value of 100 indicates that the firm has the best corporate governance behavior relative to its peer group, while a value of 0 indicates the worst behavior.
The firm with the best corporate governance behavior in the DAX 30 is SAP, which has a relative value of 84.6 in the international environment. DaimlerChrysler is the best firm relative to its industry peer firms. The mean number of 55.0 shows I construct a simple regression with two specifications to show the relationship between corporate governance and conglomerate value. The first specification uses excess value based on median peer group averaging, while the second specification uses geometric mean. For each specification I perform two separate regressions.
The first contains the corporate governance index relative to international firms, the second is relative to industry peer firms. I also control for size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. Table 9 displays the coefficients and standard errors.
The results show that all coefficients are positive and significant. This means that firms with a well established corporate governance behavior tend to be traded at a lower discount or even a premium, while firms with a low corporate governance rating are traded at a significant discount 10 . The differences between specification 1 and 2 are marginal. The coefficients for the industry index are higher than for the international index. The overall results provide evidence that a good corporate gover- 
